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Abstract
Ok and Lambert (1999) show that one does not have to be a utilitarian to accept Atkinson
and Bourguignon’s (1987) sequential generalized Lorenz dominance criterion, because the
latter is also supported by a much wider class of aggregation functions. We take a minimal
stance: we show that it suffices to be a weighted utilitarian –with higher weights for the
more needy– to accept it. We also discuss some possible extensions.
1 Motivation
When all households are homogeneous in all relevant non-income characteristics –e.g., house-
holds size, average age or handicap level of the household members, and so on– there are
many ways to assess the corresponding income distributions in terms of poverty, inequality
or welfare (see, e.g., Lambert, 2001 for an overview). In particular, the generalized Lorenz
dominance (GLD) criterion (Shorrocks, 1983) is widely accepted and used in economics. Un-
fortunately, such tools are not well-suited to make reasonable comparisons in practice, because
“At the heart of any distributional analysis, there is the problem of allowing for differences in
people’s non-income characteristics” (Cowell and Mercader-Prats, 1999). The standard way
to proceed is (i) to convert the household income distribution of heterogeneous households
into an ‘equivalent income’ distribution of reference types and (ii) to apply a social evaluation
tool –such as the GLD criterion– to the equivalent income distribution.1
Almost twenty years ago, Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) proposed a robust approach,
which is not based on the use of a specific equivalence scale to cardinalize needs, but on an
∗Erwin Ooghe is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Fund for Scientific Research - Flanders. Center for Economic
Studies, Naamsestraat, 69, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium. I would like to thank Peter Lambert for helpful comments.
1There is a debate whether one should weight the equivalent incomes by the equivalence scales or by the
household size; see Ebert (1997), Ebert and Moyes (2003), Shorrocks (2004) and Capéau and Ooghe (2004) for
a discussion. We will sidestep this issue here.
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ordinal classification of all households into different need groups. To apply their sequential
generalized Lorenz dominance (SGLD) criterion, one has to check –on the basis of the GLD
criterion– whether (i) the most needy households of one distribution, say distribution A,
dominate the most needy of another distribution, say B, (ii) whether the most and second
most needy households of distribution A together also dominate the most and second most
needy of distribution B, and so on. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) also show that the
the SGLD criterion has a strong normative support, for which we may regard the calculation
of social welfare to be split up in three succesive steps: the calculation of (1) the welfare
of each household (depending on household income and needs type) (2) the welfare of each
subgroup of households with the same needs and (3) the total welfare. In essence, Atkinson and
Bourguignon (1987) show that the SGLD criterion is equivalent with unanimity among social
welfare functions using a wide class of utility profiles in step (1) and a utilitarian approach in
steps (2) and (3).
Some authors have put considerable effort into extending the SGLD criterion, e.g., to deal
with a wider class of utility profiles, poverty, changing demographics and/or the principle of
diminishing transfers (see: Bourguignon, 1989; Atkinson, 1992; Jenkins and Lambert, 1993;
Chambaz and Maurin, 1998; Moyes, 1999; Lambert and Ramos, 2002). Others have con-
tributed to the understanding of the SGLD criterion by providing different characterizations
(see: Ok and Lambert, 1999; Ebert, 2000; Ooghe and Lambert, 2005). In particular, Ok and
Lambert (1999) show that one does not have to be a utilitarian in step (3) to accept the
SGLD criterion. They provide the ‘largest’ class of social welfare functions in step (3) which
supports the SGLD criterion, assuming Atkinson and Bourguignon’s class of utility profiles in
step (1) and utilitarianism in step (2). We present both Atkinson and Bourguignon’s (1987)
classical as well as Ok and Lambert’s (1999) result in section 2.
In this note, we take an opposite view. In section 3, we present the ‘smallest’ class of house-
hold utility profiles which can be used in step (1) to support the SGLD criterion, assuming
utilitarianism in steps (2) and (3). In particular, this class turns out to contain only profiles in
which the welfare of a household is multiplicatively separable in utility of income and needs.
As a result, the SGLD criterion is equivalent to unanimity among weighted utilitarian social
welfare functions, with higher weights assigned to higher needs groups. In a final section 4,
we discuss some possible extensions.
2 Characterizations of the SGLD criterion
We introduce some notation to define the SGLD criterion. Consider household incomes y ∈ R+
and household types k ∈ K = {1, ...,K}, ordered from least (1) to most needy (K), given the
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same household income. For example, k could be household size. A heterogeneous distribution
consists of (i) proportions of type k households, denoted pk, with
?
k∈K pk = 1, and (ii) income
distribution functions of type k households, denoted Fk, defined over a common finite support
[0, z]. For the moment we assume pk to be the same for all distributions (no changes in
demographics); we abbreviate a distribution as a list F = (F1, . . . , FK). We are ready to
define the sequential generalized Lorenz dominance criterion.
D?????????: A distribution F dominates a distribution G according to the sequential general-
ized Lorenz dominance (SGLD) criterion, denoted F ?SGLD G, if and only if for all y ∈ [0, z]
and for all k ∈ K we have
?K
i=k pi
? y
0 [Fi (x)−Gi (x)] dx ≤ 0.
We briefly present the classical characterization of the SGLD criterion by Atkinson and Bour-
guignon (1987) as well as the ‘maximal’ characterization of Ok and Lambert (1999).2 We give
an alternative ‘minimal’ characterization in the next section.
Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) consider utilitarian social welfare functions, i.e., the
social welfare of a distribution F is defined as the average utility of income, or
W (F;U) =
?
k∈K
pk
? z
0
Uk (y) dFk (y) , (1)
with Uk : R+ → R (twice differentiable) household utility functions, one for each type k ∈ K.
They consider utility profiles U = (U1, U2, . . . , UK) satisfying the following four properties:
(AB1) the marginal utility U k is positive, i.e. U

k ≥ 0, for all types k ∈ K, (AB2) the marginal
utility is decreasing, i.e., U k ≤ 0, for all types k ∈ K, (AB3) a household of needs type k
has a higher marginal utility compared to a household with needs type k − 1 (for the same
household income), i.e., U k ≥ U k−1, for all k = 2, . . . ,K, and (AB4) the difference in marginal
utility defined in (AB3) decreases with income, i.e., U k ≤ U k−1, for all k = 2, . . . ,K. Call
UAB the family of utility profiles U satisfying properties AB1-AB4. We get:
A??????? & B?????????? (1987): F ?SGLD G if and only if W (F;U) ≥ W (G;U) for
all profiles U in UAB.
Ok and Lambert (1999) show that one does not have to be a utilitarian to accept the
SGLD criterion. First, they measure household well-being via profilesU in UAB. Second, they
assume that the welfare level of a group of households with the same needs can be measured
by their average utility of income expressed per capita of the whole population, more precisely,
Wk (F;U) = pk
? z
0 Uk (y) dFk (y). Third, in contrast with Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987),
2We refer the reader to the original papers for more detailed discussion and to Ebert (2000) and Ooghe and
Lambert (2005) for alternative but, in the current context, less relevant characterizations.
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they consider a needs-based aggregation function to aggregate the subgroup welfare levels.
More precisely, an aggregation function V : RK → R is needs-based if and only if
V (a1, . . . , ak−1, ak, . . . , aK) ≥ V (a1, . . . , ak−1 + ?, ak − ?, . . . , aK) ,∀? ≥ 0,∀k = 2, . . . ,K.
Call VOL the family of needs-based aggregation functions V . We get:
O? & L?????? (1999): F ?SGLD G if and only if V (W1 (F;U) , . . . ,WK (F;U)) ≥
V (W1 (G;U) , . . . ,WK (G;U)) for all needs-based aggregation functions V in VOL and all
profiles U in UAB.
The characterization by Ok and Lambert (1999) is ‘maximal’ in the sense that they look for
the widest class of aggregation functions (for subgroup welfare levels) which, ceteris paribus,
supports the SGLD criterion. Our alternative characterization can be considered as ‘minimal’
in an analogous way: we look for the smallest class of household utility functions, ceteris
paribus, which can do the job.
3 A new characterization
Denote the class of (twice differentiable) increasing and concave utility functions by U =
{U : R+ → R |U  ≥ 0 and U  ≤ 0} and the class of positive and increasing weight vectors by
W = ?w ∈ RK+ |w1 ≤ w2 ≤ . . . ≤ wK
?
. We define U as the family of utility profiles U =
(U1, . . . , UK) ≡ (w1U, . . . , wKU) with U ∈ U and w ∈W. It is easy to verify that U ⊂ UAB.
Still, we get:
P?????????? 1. F ?SGLD G if and only if W (F;U) ≥W (G;U) for all profiles U in U.
Proof. Because U ⊂ UAB, the direction ⇒ follows from Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987).
We prove the other direction. Consider two arbitrary distributions F and G. For ease of
exposition, define, for each type k, the functions
H1k : [0, z]→ R : y :→ Fk (y)−Gk (y) and H2k : [0, z]→ R : y :→
? y
0
H1k (x) dx.
The welfare dominance statement W (F;U) ≥W (G;U) for all profiles U in U is equivalent
with ? z
0
U (y) d
??
k∈K
pkwkH
1
k (y)
?
≥ 0 for all U ∈ U and for all w ∈W. (2)
Using Lambert (2001, lemma 3.1, p.54), the first part of equation (2), more precisely
? z
0
U (y) d
??
k∈K
pkwkH
1
k (y)
?
≥ 0 for all U ∈ U
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is equivalent with ? y
0
??
k∈K
pkwkH
1
k (x)
?
dx ≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0, z] .
Using the definition of the functions H2k , equation (2) is equivalent with
?
k∈K
pkwkH
2
k (y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0, z] and for all w ∈W. (3)
Defining a1 = w1 ≥ 0 and ak = wk − wk−1 ≥ 0, for all k = 2, . . . ,K, we can equivalently
rewrite equation (3) as
?
k∈K
ak
?
K?
i=k
piH
2
i (y)
?
≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0, z] and for all (a1, a2, . . . , aK) ∈ RK+ . (4)
Using Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987, lemma 2, p.368), equation (4) holds if and only
if
?K
i=k piH
2
i (y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0, z] and for all k ∈ K, which is (by definition) the
SGLD criterion. ?
Proposition 1 tells us that it suffices to look at household utility functions which are
multiplicatively separable in utility of needs (as measured by the weight vector w) and utility
of income (as measured by the utility function U). It allows us to reinterpret the SGLD
criterion as equivalent to weighted utilitarianism, where more needy households receive larger
weights. The next section concludes, discussing some possible extensions.
4 Some extensions
First, in the spirit of Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (2003), we could put additional lower
and upper bounds on the weights to obtain more complete quasi-orderings. We define a set
of bounded weights as W (w,w) = {w ∈W |wi ≤ wi ≤ wi for all i ∈ K} for lower and upper
bound vectors w = (w1, . . . , wK) ≤ w = (w1, . . . , wK) and let U (w,w) be the family of
utility profiles U ≡ (w1U, . . . , wKU) with U ∈ U and w ∈W (w,w). It is easy to verify that
U (w,w) ⊂ U. We get:
P?????????? 2. W (F;U) ≥W (G;U) for all profiles U in U (w,w) if and only if
?
k∈K
pkwkH
2
k (y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0, z] and for all w ∈W (w,w) .
Proof. Follows directly from the proof of proposition 1 up to equation (3). ?
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As
?
k∈K pkwkH
2
k (y) is a continuous function and W (w,w) is a compact set, the criterion in
proposition 2 can be implemented, e.g., by checking whether max
w∈W(w,w)
?
k∈K pkwkH
2
k (y) ≤ 0
holds for all y ∈ [0, z].
Second, one could also use a different strategy to restrict the set of weights. The fact that
wi ≥ wj for all i ≥ j in the set W guarantees that a (marginal) money transfer from a poor
and needy household (say type i) to a richer and less needy household (with type j ≤ i),
cannot increase social welfare. One could additionally impose that (for the same household
incomes) such regressive transfers have a stronger (negative) effect on social welfare when
both households become more needy (changing needs types from i and j to i+ 1 and j + 1),
ceteris paribus. To obtain this, we could focus on a set3
W◦ = {w ∈W |wk −wk−1 ≥ wk−1 − wk−2 for all k = 3, . . . ,K and w2 − w1 ≥ w1 }
and let U◦ ⊂ U denote the corresponding family of utility profiles. This leads to a weighted
version of the sequential generalized Lorenz dominance criterion, with higher weights for the
more needy.
P?????????? 3. W (F;U) ≥W (G;U) for all profiles U in U◦ if and only if
K?
i=k
(k − i+ 1) piH2i (y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0, z] and for all k ∈ K.
Proof. Reconsider the proof of proposition 1 up to equation (4). Defining b1 = a1 ≥ 0 and
bk = ak − ak−1 ≥ 0, for all k = 2, . . . ,K, we can equivalently rewrite equation (4) as
?
k∈K
bk
?
K?
i=k
(i− k + 1) piH2i (y)
?
≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0, z] and for all (b1, b2, . . . , bK) ∈ RK+ . (5)
As before, equation (5) holds if and only if
?K
i=k (i− k + 1) piH2i (y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0, z] and
for all k ∈ K. ?
Notice that proposition 3 can be extended in a straightforward way, by restricting the signs of
the differences wk−wk−1−(wk−1 − wk−2), and so on. The corresponding sequential generalized
Lorenz dominance criteria will put increasingly more weight on the higher needs classes. In
the limit, one obtains a Rawlsian criterion: a distribution F is better than G if and only if
FK generalized Lorenz dominates GK .
3Notice that the last condition w2 − w1 ≥ w1 (possibly in combination with previous ones) implies that a
(marginal) money transfer from a poor and needy household (of type i) to a richer (say income y) and less
needy household (of type i − 1) is worse for social welfare than simply taking the same marginal amount of
money away from a household of type 1 and income y.
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Finally, if demographics are allowed to change, we must compare (extended) distributions
denoted by F = (p;F), which consists of both proportions p = (p1, ..., pK) and distribution
functions F = (F1, . . . , FK); an alternative (extended) distribution will be denoted by G =
(q;G). To extend the above proposition to deal with changing demographics one has to
impose an additional level condition on the common utility function U . Either one could
assume U (z) = 0, which implies Ui (z) = Uj (z) for all i, j ∈ K, for each profile U in U.4
Welfare dominance for this restricted class of utility profiles is equivalent with Jenkins and
Lambert’s (1993) and Chambaz and Maurin’s (1998) extension of the SGLD criterion:
K?
i=k
? y
0
[piFi (x)− qiGi (x)] dx ≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0, z] and for all k ∈ K. (6)
Or one could impose the weaker condition U ≤ 0 on [0, z] (and thus Uk−1 ≥ Uk on [0, z] for all
k = 2, . . . ,K for each profile U in U) to get Moyes’ (1999) extension, which equals condition
(6) together with the conditions
?K
i=k (pk − qk) ≤ 0 for all k ∈ K.
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